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ABSTRACT 
Research shows that comparison ads can be particularlyejfectivefor businesses with 
relatively small market shares. However, there are legal risks associated with such strategies. 
Therefore, in this article we overview constitutional law, common law, and statutory law as 
they relate to claims made about competitors in comparative advertising. We carefully exp/ore 
First Amendn1ent rights and then examine the various causes of action in deception suits and 
Section 43a of the Lanham Act. We conclude with suggestions for the small business owner 
using comparison advertising to gain market share. 
INTRODUCTION 
The small business owner must determine how to best communicate products and 
services to the buyer. Research suggests that firms with small market share benefit from using 
comparison advertising to improve customer attitudes and sales (Gnepa, 1993; Pechmann & 
Stewart, 1991; Shimp & Dyer, 1978). A direct comparison advertisement is one in which the 
advertiser directly names the competition and states the advantages of the product/service over 
that offered by the competition. Comparison ads are encouraged by government regulators, 
notably the FTC, because they provide an informative environment for the consumer and foster 
product/service improvement (Beck-Dudley & Williams, 1989; Muehling & Kangun, 1985; 
Petty, 1991; Wilkie & Farris, 1975). 
Unfortunately, advertisers can run into trouble with the judicial branch of the 
government when using comparison advertisements (Bixby & Lincoln, 1989). First 
Amendment rights regarding protected speech are being eroded in the commercial speech arena 
(Boedecker, Morgan, & Wright, 1995), thereby increasing the consequences of making an 
inaccurate advertising claim. Additionally, plaintiff companies are more likely to seek legal 
redress against competitors making false or misleading claims about the plaintiffs product or 
service (Beck-Dudley & Williams, 1989; Buchanan, 1985). The purpose of this article is to 
provide small business owners with information needed to make an informed decision 
regarding comparison advertising. We begin by overviewingthe literature on comparison ads, 
their execution and effectiveness. We then explore the legal environment regarding 
comparative advertising in which small business owners work. The conditions under which the 
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full force of First Amendment rights take effect, including issues on the nature of the speech 
(commercial or noncommercial)and the status of the subject of discussion (private or public), 
are discussed. We then review the various types of deception suits and provide a brief analysis 
of Section 43a of the Lanham Act as they relate to comparative advertising. Finally, we 
provide guidelines for small business owners interested in using comparison advertising. 
WHY SMALL BUSINESSES MAY WISH TO USE 
COMPARISON ADVERTISING 
Comparison advertising is one of the most researchedadvertisem:nt-execution styles 
in the areas of marketing and advertising (Pechmann & Stewart, 1991 ). While many different 
types of comparisonadvertisementsexist, we will focus on the direct comparison ad in which 
one or more competitors are actively named in the advertising copy. A recent example of such 
an advertising strategy is Hardee's ad comparing its fried chicken to KFC's. Two specific 
attributes of the chicken, piece size and taste, are tackled head-on in Hardee's print and 
broadcast advertisement;. Another example is seen in an ad for a local "park n' shuttle." The 
ad states, "Why pay ~38.50/week at the airport? Park at BRAND X' fo! just 24.99/week." 
Many researchers have concluded that comparison ads primarily benefit small market 
share holders (c.f., Gnepa, 1993; Shimp & Dyer, 1978). For small market share holders, 
comparison ads have been shown to positively affect attitudes (Donthu, 1992) and to have had 
an impact on sales and market shares (Hayes, 1994; Pechmann & Stewart, 1991). Recently, 
Donthu ( 1992) found that a moderately intense comparison ad had the strongest positive 
impact on attitudes while very intense comparison ads had the most positive effect on 
advertisement recall. In other words, comparison ads were found to be more effective than 
advertisements which made no comparison to competing brands. 
Comparison ads may create positive attitudes for one of several reasons. A small 
market share holder may benefit from being associated with market leaders because of 
favorable positioning effects (Muehling, Stem, & Raven, 1989). For instance, Coor's Cutter, 
a non-alcoholic brew, should benefit by comparing itself with Samuel Adams beer, a popular 
premium beer. Additionally, a direct comparison ad can cause the consumer to rethink a 
purchase--i.e.,the ad may "disrupt" purchase behavior so that the small market-share brand is 
considered by the buyer (Muehling, Stem, & Raven, 1989). Finally, Pechmann and Stewart 
( 1991) found that direct comparison ads attract more attention since they are perceived to be 
novel and often contain the name of a well-known brand. This greater attention, in tum, 
increases persuasion. 
While increasing the persuasiveness of advertisements is a noble goal, small 
businesses need to use techniques which actually impact sales. After analyzing field data, 
Pechmann and Stewart (1991) concluded that consumers were more likely to choose the 
advertised brand over the competing brands when the advertised brand used direct comparative 
advertisements. According io Advertising Age (Advertjsjng Age, 1980; Advertising Age, 
1982) direct comparison ads are responsible for market share gains made by Burger King, 
Pepsi-Cola, Suave Shampoos, and Schick electric shavers. More recently, Mrs. Winner's 
Chicken & Biscuits and Hardee's have been successful using this technique (Hayes, 1994). 
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Jartran experienced $70 million-plus sales increase from 1979-1980 after running direct 
comparison advertisementssuggestingthat Jartran trucks had better gas mileage, were newer, 
and were less expensive to rent than U-Haul's trucks (Beck-Dudley & Williams, 1989). 
The Jartran advertisements are of particular interest since the ads were deemed 
deceptive by the U.S. courts. Jartran was required to pay $40 million in damages and $2.5 
million in attorney fees to U-Haul due to the deception. Such cases are likely to become more 
common since firms are more inclined to institute litigation as a means of vindicating their 
reputation or economic interests when false or misleading statements have been made about 
their products (Buchanan & Goldman, 1989). Thus, we now examine the regulatory 
environment in which small businesses operate. 
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT FOR 
COMPARISON ADVERTISEMENTS 
Despite the advantagesofusing comparison advertising, such a strategy may open the 
door to litigation brought by the competitor. For instance, in July 1986, Blue Cross/Blue Shield 
launched what it called a deliberately "aggressive and provocative" comparative advertising 
campaign designed to "introduce and increase the attractivenessof its products" at the expense 
of U.S. Healthcare'sproducts,a competing HMO (US. Healthcare Inc. v, Blue Cross of Greater 
Philadelphia, 1990). The campaign consisted of several print, television, and radio 
advertisements, and a direct mail brochure. Many of the ads claimed that with an HMO, the 
subscriber selects a primary care physician who, in turn, must give permission before the HMO 
will cover examination by a specialist. The print ads and the brochure stated the following: 
You should also know that through a series of financial incentives, an HMO 
encourages this doctor to handle as many patients as possible without 
referring to a specialist. When an HMO doctor does make a specialist 
referral, it could take money directly out of his pocket. Make too many 
referrals, and he could find himself in trouble with HMO (U.S. Healthcare 
Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia,1990.) 
Two Blue Cross/Blue Shield advertisements featured a senior citizen under the banner 
heading "Your money or your life," juxtaposed with Blue Cross/Blue Shield's description of 
"The high cost of HMO Medicare." U.S. Healthcare responded immediately to the attacks by 
filing suit against Blue Cross/Blue Shield. In addition, U.S. Healthcare embarked on its own 
aggressive comparative ad campaign -- to which Blue Cross/Blue Shield countersued. 
Plaintiffs in these suits have traditionally sought relief under common law doctrines 
such as injurious falsehood (e.g., Bose Corn. v. Consumers Union of United States. Inc., 1981; 
1982; 1984; Cumberland Farms. Inc. v. Evere!!, 1991) and defamation(e.g., Dun & Bradstreet 
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders. Inc .. 1985; U.S. Healthcare. Inc. v Blue Cross of Greater 
Philadelphi[l,1990). More recently, however, plaintiffs are turning to state or federal statutory 
provisions such as Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act (e.g. Castro! Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 1993; 
Coors Brewing Company v. Anheuser-Busch Companies. Inc.,1992; Johnson & Johnson• 
Merck v. Smithkline Beecham, 1992), and similar state statutes to seek liability for those who 
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make false or misleading claims about their products or services. However, before discussing 
these legal remedies, it is useful to understand the constitutional right to freedom of speech and 
how this right is likely to be applied to comparison ads. 
The First Amendment--FreedomofSpeech vs. Deceptive Claims Regarding Competitors 
The Supreme Court has recognized that in order to further First Amendment rights 
to engage in truthful expression, it may be necessary to allow defendants to escape liability for 
certain false statements. Both common law and statutory law are at odds with this principle 
since both provide for payment of damages when false claims are made. Thus, we must 
examine when First Amendment rights are enforced fully in the U.S. court system. 
In the 1964 landmarkcase,New York Times y. Sumyan, the U.S. Supreme Court did 
not allow damages to the plaintiff even though claims made in the defendant's political 
advertisement were literally false. The case revolved around a one-page "editorial" 
advertisement entitled "Heed Their Rising Voices" which solicited financial support for a 
Black student movement and furthered the campaign for Black Americans' right to vote. The 
advertisementstated that truckloads of police ringed the Alabama State College Campus after 
a peaceful demonstration on the State Capitol steps and that "they" (the police) had arrested 
Dr. Martin Luther King seven times. In actuality, the police had not ringed the campus, nor had 
police been deployed as a response to the peaceful demonstration. Additionally, Dr. King had 
been arrested only four times, not seven. Even given the falsity of these statements, the 
Supreme Court ruled that this speech was fully protected by the First Amendmentand that false 
statements are protected by the First Amendment as long as there is no actual malice ~ 
York Times v Sullivan 1964). Actual malice occurs when one makes statements known to the 
speaker to be false or makes the statement with reckless disregard to the statement's 
truthfulness. 
The rationale behind this landmark decision is that freedom of speech is paramount 
to the democratic form of government in the United States in which issues of public concern 
must be debated. According to the Supreme Court, all speech, even inaccurate speech, can 
contribute to the discussion of important public issues by sparking greater interest and greater 
participation in such debates. Enforcing monetary damages for such speech could decrease 
debate and reduce the number of viewpoints expressed. 
If blatantly false statements may be protected by the First Amendment, why then are 
inaccurate claims made in comparative advertisements subject to liability? First, while the 
Constitution protects speech, the Supreme Court has "long recognized that not all speech is of 
equal First Amendment importance" (Dun & Bradstreet y, Greenmoss Builders, 1985). For 
example, speech involving commercial speech receives less First Amendment protection than 
noncommercial speech, while speech involvingpublicjigures receives heightened protection. 
Each of these criteria is considered independently. For instance, even if the speech is 
determined to be commercial, but involves public figures, the full effect of First Amendment 
defenses are available and the plaintiff must prove actual malice. We discuss each of these 
criterion and their rationale below. 
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Commercial versus Noncommercial Speech 
One of the most prominent examples of reduced protection for certain kinds of speech 
concerns commercial speech. The Supreme Court has noted that commercial speech occupies 
a "subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values" (Dun & Bradstreet v. 
Greenmoss Builder:;, 1985, 158) and has held that commercial speech merits an intermediate 
level of First Amendment protection (Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council. Inc., 1976). 
The Supreme Court has defined commercial speech in a variety of ways. Sometimes 
the Court has defined commercial speech as expression that is solely in the economic interest 
of the speaker and his or her audience (Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corooration v Public 
Service Commission, I 980), or as expression that does no more than propose a commercial 
transaction(VirginiaState Bd. Of Pharmacyv. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council. Inc., 1976 
quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human RelationsCommissio[I, I 973). More recently, the Third 
Circuit defined commercial speech as an "expression related to the economic interests of the 
speaker and its audience, generally in the form of a commercial advertisement for the sale of 
goods and services" (U.S. Healthcarev. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphi!!, I 990 citing Bolger 
v. Young Drug Products Coro., I983, 66-67). In 1983, the Supreme Court declared three 
factors to be considered in determining if speech is commercial: 
"(I) is the speech an advertisement; 
(2) does the speech refer to a specific product or service; and 
(3) does the speaker have an economic motivation for the speech" (Bolger v Young 
Drugs Product Coro., 1983). 
Why should commercial speech receive less protection? First, commercial speech is 
made solely for the monetary interest of the speaker or to promote the speaker's own goals 
(Central Hudson Gas & Electric Coro v. Public Service Commission, 1980). This differs 
significantly from political speech which, perhaps, has more noble goals. Second, 
advertisementsand other forms of commercial speech are durable. Additionally, commercial 
speakers are knowledgeable regarding their products/services and the market in which they 
operate; therefore, commercial speakers should be able to evaluate the truthfulness of their 
claims (e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Com. v. Public Service Commission, 1980; Virnjnia 
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Cjtizens Consumer Council. Inc., 1976). 
Note that in the New York Times v. Sullivan (1964) case, the speech at issue was an 
advertisement, but the courts determined that even though the defendants paid for the media 
space, the speech was not commercial since the subject matter dealt with a burning social issue 
of the time--civil rights. Thus, the fact that media space was paid for by the advertiser does not 
necessarily deem speech to be commercial. 
Today, it appears that the definition of commercial speech is expanding, and with this 
expansion, firms' First Amendment rights are contracting (Boedecker, Morgan, & Wright, 
1995). For example, in the U.S. Healthcare v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia (1990), the 
two parties argued that they were providing information about health care--an issue of public 
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concern. The court, however found that "although some of the advertisements touch on matter.; 
of public concern, their central thrust is commercial. Thus the parities have acted primarily to 
generate revenue by influencing customers, not to resolve 'the issues involved'." (~ 
Hudson Gas and Electric Coro. v. Public Service Commission, 1980, 939). In another case, 
the courts classified informationpamphletsdescribingappropriateuse of condoms to help slow 
the spread of illness as commercial speech even though the pamphlet was developed as a 
public service !Bolger y Youngs Drug Product Corp., 1983). Given the above, the prudent 
small business owner should assume that any comparative advertisement will be viewed as 
commercial speech, even ifthe speech deals with an important public issue such as healthcare, 
environmental concerns, crime prevention, or other "prominent" issue. 
Status of the Plaintiff: Prjyate General-Puroose and Limited-Purnose Public Figures 
First Amendment protection also depends on whether the plaintiff is deemed to be a 
public or private figure. The Court has recognized two types of public figures. General-purpo!i! 
public figures are individuals "who by reason of the notoriety of their achievements or the 
vigor and success with which they seek the public's attention" have put themselves in the 
public eye (Gertz v, Robert Welch. Inc,, 1974, 342). The second type, limited-purpose public 
figures, are individuals who have "voluntarily inject[ed] [themselves] or [have been] drawn 
into a particular public controversy and thereby become public figure[s] for a limited range of 
issues" (Gertz v Robert Welch. Inc,. 1974, 342). Both types of public figures must prove actual 
malice. 
Speech regarding public figures is subject to full First Amendment protection since 
actions of public figures should be subject to debate. This allows open criticism of govemmert 
officials which is critical to maintaining the American style of government. Additionally, 
public figures have placed themselves in a position of public scrutiny and thereby invite 
attention and comment. Finally, public figures "usually enjoy greater access to the channels 
of effective communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false 
statements than private individuals normally enjoy" (Gertz v. Robert Welch. Inc., 1974, 344). 
Determining whether a plaintiffis a private or public figure is guided by the Gertz v, 
Robert Welch. Inc. (1974) case. In~. lible was brought against a magazine publisher for 
describing the plaintiff (Elmer Gertz, a prominent attorney) as a "Communist-fronter," 
"Leninist," and participant in various "Marxist" and "Red" activities. The Supreme Court held 
that a newspaper or broadcaster publishing defamatory falsehoods about a private individual 
(i.e., one who is neither a public official nor a public figure) may not claim a constitutional 
privilege against liability, for injury inflicted, simply because an issue of public concern is 
addressed. The Court held that the status of the defamed person also must be considered. 
Unfortunately, the fact-specific nature about the public figure inquiry makes it 
difficultto generalize about which parties will be deemed public figures(Langvardt, 1993). For 
instance, the Supreme Court has determined the classification of public figures includes 
persons such as political candidates.retired military generals, and well-known former football 
coaches (e.g., Harte-Hanks Communications Inc, y, Connaughton, 1989; Associated Press y, 
~. 1967; Curtis Publishing Co, v, Butts, 1967). However, a prominent private attorney, 
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a wealthysocialite,an alleged spy, and a recipient of government research grants were found 
to be private figures (e.g., Gertz v. Welch lnc.,1974; Time. Inc. v. Firestone, 1976). 
Cases brought by commercial plaintiffs further complicate the private versus public 
figure determination. The Supreme Court has not engaged in a substantive public/private 
figure analysis in a suit involving a commercial plaintiff, however, the lower courts have had 
to decide cases brought by commercial plaintiffs (e.g., Bose Com. v. Consumer Union of 
United States Inc .. 1981; 1982; 1984; National Life Ins Co. v Phillips Publishing Inc, 1992). 
The lower courts have found that the standards established in~ to be ill-suited to corporate 
plaintiff cases (Langvardt, 1993). Although Gertz's general purpose public figure classification 
would seemingly encompass corporations whose names are immediately recognizable (e.g., 
IBM, McDonald's),it is unclear whether a given corporation possesses the notoriety necessary 
to warrant public figure status. The corporation's size may not be a helpful predictor since the 
public may be equally or more familiar with relatively small corporations than many larger 
corporations whose names and business are generally unknown (Langvardt, 1993). In the 
recent U.S. Healthcare v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia (1990) case, the court found 
neither of the parties involved to be limited-purpose public figures. In making this 
determination, the court looked at three factors. First, they determined whether the entities had 
media access; then they determined whether the parties had voluntarily placed themselves in 
a public forum; and, finally, they determined whether the content of the speech was self-
motivatedor was of public concern While both parties had media access and had voluntarily 
opened themselves to criticism, neither was deemed a limited-purpose public figure since the 
issue was motivated by economic rather than public interest. 
Given the above discussion, it is clear that a corporate plaintiff will argue that it is a 
private figure so that the actual malice standards do not have to be met for the plaintiff to 
receive compensation. 
Common and Statutory Law Resolutions to Deceptive Claims in ComoarativeAdvertising 
Common law doctrines and general statutory provisions come into play once the 
speech is considered to be commercial and the plaintiff is deemed a private figure. The focus 
of each cause of action is the imposition of liability for the consequences caused by false or 
misleading expressions. Most often, direct comparison advertisements are not permitted to 
invoke the First Amendment protection as in New York Times v. Sullivan ( 1964). Indeed, "Far 
more often, however, ads generate litigation over pejorative comments about products and 
services, comments which may damage corporate profits and reputations" (Milton, Wall, 
Herbert, Rubins, & Strickland, 1994). Several causes of action may be alleged in such cases, 
including: injurious falsehood, defamation, and violations of §43(a) of the Lanham Act. Each 
of these causes of action is discussed below along with whether and to what extent the First 
Amendment protection developed in New York Times v. Sullivan (1964) have applied. 
Injurious Falsehood 
Injurious falsehood is the publication, with fault, of a false statement about a 
company's business, business practices, product, service, property, or property rights, which 
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results in harm, measured by proven special damages to the company's economic interest 
(Keeton, Dobbs, Keeton, & Owen, 1984 ). Thus, when an advertisement makes false statements 
that directly disparage or demean the quality of that company's products or services, causing 
financial damage to the company, a specific form of injurious falsehood, known as product 
liability or trade libel, may be invoked (Keeton, et al., 1984). The common law establishes the 
following elements for injurious falsehood liability: 
(1) publication ofa harmful false statement disparaging the quality of another's 
product or property; 
(2) intentto harm another's interest, awareness of the likelihood of such harm, or 
reasonable basis for such awareness; 
(3) knowledge or reckless disregard of falsity ("actual malice"); and 
(4) proofofspecial damages. 
Under common law, a firm may compare its own goods or services to those of a 
competitor provided that it does not include any false statements of fact (Hogue, 1993). This 
privilege is qualified however, and does not apply to statements made with malice or bad faith.' 
The heightened standard of proof required under the First Amendment fully applies (see New 
York Tjmes v. Sullivan, 1964). This heightened standard of proof requires that the plaintiff 
prove "actual malice" by clear and convincing evidence that the disparaging statement was 
false and that it was made with either knowledge of its falsehood, or with reckless disregard 
of its truth or falsity (New York Times v. Sullivan, 1964 ). 
The leading case applying First Amendment defenses in a noncommercial product 
disparagement case is Bose Corooration v. Consumers Union (1984) in which an article 
appearing in Consumer Reports magazine described the plaintiffs stereo speakers in 
disparaging terms. Specifically, the article asserted that "individual instruments heard through 
the Bose system seemed to grow to gigantic proportions and tended to wander about the 
room ... With orchestral music, such effects seemed inconsequential. But we think they might 
become annoying when listening to soloists" (Bose Corooratjon v. Consumers Unjon, 1984, 
488). The First Circuit, reviewing the district court's decision focused on the plaintiffs failure 
to prove actual malice. The Supreme Court, in upholding the circuit court's opinion, made it 
evident that when a disparaging statement is made in the context of noncommercial speech 
(such as a newspaper article or review), all First Amendment defenses apply. This is not so, 
however, when the speech is classified as commercial. 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that while truthful commercial speech is 
entitled to some First Amendment protection, the First Amendment will not prevent the 
restraint -- or even complete prohibition -- of false or misleading commercial speech (e.g., 
Bolgery. Youngs Drugs Products Coro,. 1983; Central Hudson Gas & Electric Coro v, Public 
Seryjce Comm'n of New York. 1980). Until recently, all cases in which the Supreme Court 
addressed the protection due to commercial speech involved government regulation of 
advertising or other forms of commercial speech rather than product disparagement. The 
question of whether the New York Times actual malice standard of proofapplies to disparagirg 
statements made in product advertisements or whether such commercial speech is entitled to 
less First Amendment protection was finally addressed by the Third Circuit in U.S. Healthcare. 
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Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia(l 990). The Third Circuit concluded that the actual 
malice standard does not apply to false commercial speech such as that contained in 
comparative advertisementsof competing companies. In other words, a company asserting any 
false statement may be held liable, regardless of whether the company believed the statement 
to be true. While actual malice has traditionally been required in injurious falsehood suits, 
cases involving commercial speech are clearly different. 
However, cases addressing this issue in other jurisdictions suggest that the answer is 
far from well-settled. In National Life Insurance Co. v. Phillips Publishing. Inc. (1992), the 
Maryland District Court distingui!hed and implicitly criticized the Third Circuit's decision in 
U.S. Healthcar~ holding that the actual malice standard was applicable in this case involving 
defamatory statements made in the defendant'smarketingmaterials.Although the National Life 
Insurance court found that the statements in question were not "commercial speech," the court 
held that even ifthe statements were commercial speech, the actual malice standard set forth 
in~ would still apply. In the National Life Insurance court's view, the appropriatestandanl 
depends upon the particular "reputation interest" of each plaintiff rather than an automatic 
application of a negligence standard for all false commercial speech. If the status of the 
plaintiff, rather than the nature of the speech, proves to be the key First Amendment inquiry, 
then the outcome of future injurious falsehood cases involving advertising may depend on 
whether the plaintiff is found to be a public figure. 
Defamation 
Defamation is said to have occurred when the false statements reflect not only on a 
competitor's product or service, but actually affect the reputation of the company's officers or 
employees. The common law defines defamatim as the publication of a false and defamatory 
statement about the plaintiff! A statement is regarded to be defamatory if it "tends to so harm 
the reputationofanother as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third 
persons from associating or dealing with him.4 It is this focus on reputation which separates 
defamation from injurious falsehood.' 
Prior to 1964, plaintiffs defamation suits were virtually unconstrained by the 
defendant's First Amendmentright to free speech. The United States Supreme Court's holding 
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan in 1964 redefined defamation's constitutional contours by 
attempting to strike a balance between the plaintiffs reputational interest and the defendant's 
competing interest in free speech. The plaintiff in New York Times was an Alabama police 
commissionerwho claimed that false statements made in a political advertisement in the New 
York Times defamed him. The Supreme Court concluded that the advertisement was political 
speech, rather than a commercial advertisement, because of its commentary on the civil rights 
struggle, a major public issue of the time. The Supreme Court focused on the potential 
constitutional deficiency of defamation's strict liability standard, which the Court thought 
likely to chill the exercise ofFirst Amendment freedoms (Langvardt, 1993). Because the Court 
believed that "erroneous statement is inevi1able in free debate" Q:lew York Times v. Sullivan, 
1964, 271) it devised a rule that would provide the essential "breathing space" necessary for 
free expression to flourish: 
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The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits 
a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood 
relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made 
with 'actual malice' -- that is, with knowledge that it was false or with 
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not <New York Times v. 
Sullivan, 1964, 279-280). 
The Court provided further First Amendment protection by raising the standard of proof by 
which plaintiffs needed to show actual malice, requiring clear and convincing evidence rather 
that merely a preponderance of the evidence. 
The common law takes a strict liability approach in defamation actions; thus, a 
plaintiff is not required to prove the defendant's knowledge of falsity or lack of reasonable 
attempts to ascertain the truth (Keeton, et al., 1984). Rather, ifthe advertisement is proven 
false, the defendant is liable even ifhe or she possessed a well-founded belief in its truth. 
Three years after New York Times y. Sullivan ( 1964 ), the actual malice requirement 
was extended to suits brought by public figure plaintiffs, because, as Chief Justice Warren 
reasoned in his concurrence, public figures resemble public officials as objects of intense 
public interest and potentially influential participants in public debate (Curtis Publishing Co. 
y. Butts and Associated Press v, Walker. 1967, 142). However, when the Court addressed the 
issue of the First Amendment's role in defamation suits brought by private figure plaintiffs, the 
Court initially focused on the degree of public interest or concern present in the speech rather 
than the plaintiff's status, but later refocused on the plaintiff's status as determinative of the 
appropriate extent ofFirst Amendment accommodation( e.g., Rosenbloom v, Metromedia. Inc .. 
1971; Gertz v. Welch Inc., 1974). The actual malice requirement, together with the heightened 
standardofproofnecessary,has made it extremely difficult for public figure plaintiffs to win 
defamation suits. Therefore, plaintiffs seek to avoid being classified as a public figure 
whenever any ambiguity exists. 
Lanham Act 
Since its enactment in 1946, §43(a) of the Lanham Act' prohibited false advertising 
about one's own products or services. Because the original section 43(a) had a strict liability 
regime, containing no knowledge component or fault requirement such as those required in 
defamation actions, the Lanham Act cause of action was widely used in false advertising 
actions. In other words, defendants who made false statements about their products were liable 
under §43(a) regardless of their good faith belief that the representations were true. Section 
43(a) was significantly expanded in 1988 (effective 1989)7 to extend the prohibition against 
false and misleading advertising to false statements made by a defendant about the plaintiff's 
products or services. The new version of §43(a) provides: 
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or 
any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, tenn, name, symbol, 
or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, 
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false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation 
of fact, which-
(I) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the 
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or 
as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or 
commercial activities by another person, or 
(2) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, 
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another 
person's goods, services or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil 
action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged 
by such act. 8 
Thus, since a section 43(a) claim is in order when an advertiser makes false or misleading 
statements regarding another firm's goods, services or commercial activities, the amended 
section 43(a) departs significantly from the prior version which focussed solely on the claims 
made about one's own products or services. 
Section 43(a) is completely outcome-driven rather than intention-driven meaning that 
the firm does not need to prove malice on the part of the competing advertiser. Rather, the 
courts focus on how consumers interpret the advertisement and whether such an adverti,.,ment 
would have a detrimental financial impact on the plaintiff. 
Using §43(a) of the Lanham Act is beneficial to the offended firm because it allows 
the firm to obtain an injunction against the company making false claims so that the firm can 
stop the decline in sales caused by the misleading ad (Bixby & Lincoln, 1989). Section 43(a) 
also allows a firm to be financially compensated for any monetary damages caused by the 
misleading comparison (Bixby & Lincoln, 1989). 
stated: 
The constitutionality of the new version of §43(a) is questioned. Langvardt (1993) 
A fundamental issue thus arises: whether plaintiffs who would be 
subject to First Amendment-mandated proof requirements in a suit brought 
on defamation or injurious falsehood grounds, may evade those same 
strictures by bringing the same claim under section 43(a). When viewed in 
this manner, the issue must be answered in the negative even when the 
attempted evasion apparently conforms with the language Congress used-or 
did not use. Federal Statutes are no less subject to the Constitution than is the 
common law ... 
Thus, Congress erred when it enacted the "commercial defamation" 
component of section 43(a), by not adequately accounting for the First 
Amendment interests at stake for speakers and their audience. Courts should 
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not repeat the mistake when they decide "defamation" and "injurious 
falsehood" cases brought under section 43(a). (pp. 331-333) 
Langvardt ( 1993) noted, however, that the courts have, in fact, avoided or ignored the First 
Amendment implications of the amended section 43(a) or have dealt with them unsatisfactori~ 
(American Express Travel Related Services Co. v. Mastercard lot's. Inc,, I 991; .!.!..S.. 
Healthcare. Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Phi!adelphja. 1990; Weight Watchers Int's. Inc. v. 
Stouffer Coro,, 1990). Given the questionableconstitutionalityof the revised act, it is too early 
to tell its long-term effect. 
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 
SMALL BUSINESS MANAGER 
Comparison advertising is likely to become more common in the future as businesses 
become more aggressive due to strong competition. Indeed, there are many reasons for the 
small business owner with a superior product or service to use this type of advertising format. 
These reasons include creating positive consumer attitudes, increasing sales and market share, 
swaying competitors' customers to try the products/servicesoffered by the small business, and 
positioning the small business's offering more closely to the market leader. However, as 
comparison advertising increases, litigation such as the U-Haul v. Jartran and U,S, Healthcare. 
Inc. y. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia may also increase. This type of litigation can be 
quite costly in both a time and a monetary sense. Thus, we provide some suggestions for the 
small business strategist regarding how to avoid such litigation. 
Several authors have suggested that a comparative advertising strategy is more 
frequently used by small firms compared to larger competitors ( c.f., Petty, 1991 ). Given this, 
common and statutory law and Section 43a of the Lanham Act provides an opportunity for 
these larger competitors to bring suit against smaller competitors. As Petty ( 1991) explains, 
the smaller firms would have to bear the cost of defending the suit. Additionally, if a cease and 
desist order is given, the small firm would also have to bear the costs of designing a new ad 
campaign. Given that the resources of major competitors are likely to be greater than those of 
the small business owner, litigation is a greater threat to small businesses. Clearly, as detailed 
below, the small business practitioner will want to do everything in his or her power to ensure 
that a legal suit is unlikely to occur. 
Common law and the Section 43a of the Lanham Act could also be used by larger 
firms to harass smaller businesses. Such suits could be used to curtail legal competitive actions 
taken by the small business and to increase the costs of operating the small business. However, 
it should be noted that any litigation which lacks a legitimate basis can be challenged by the 
small business under antitrust laws as "sham" litigation (Hurwitz, 1985; Petty, 1991) since it 
threatens a competitive environment (Petty, 1991 ). 
From an advertising strategy viewpoint it is important to restate that often marketers' 
communicatiJns are subject to strict liability standards rather than full protection of the First 
Amendment. This means that the outcome of the comparison advertisement is important. The 
intent of the ad (i.e., whether the advertiser knowingly made false or misleading claims) is 
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irrelevant. Petty (1991) asserts that the most important consideration in comparative 
advertising is "what the audience actually perceived' when exposed to such an ad. This being 
the case, small business owners/strategistsneed to use caution when making claims. All claims 
must be backed by supporting research (Castro! Inc v. Pennzoil Co., 1993). Thus, it is critical 
that the small business owner have demonstrated consistency between the intended and 
received messages. S/he may want to possess evidence of how consumers perceive a particular 
ad be/are actually running the ad. This does not imply that the small business owner must do 
extensive research or hire an outside agency to do this research. A simple survey of individuals 
in the relevant target market regarding their perception of the advertisement would suffice. 
Increasingly, surveys are accepted as evidence in law-suits and hearings involving 
advertisement perceptions (Blum, 1995). Blum goes so far as to state that surveys are "so 
established in commercial suits that judges sometimes draw a negative inference if a case 
doesn't include one" (1995, p. Al). Since the target customer's perception of the 
advertisement is at issue, it makes intuitive sense to ask the customer rather than relying on the 
"experts." Additionally,surveys may be a more efficient means to present evidence than using 
costly expert witnesses (Blum, 1995). 
Recall the airport parking ad cited earlier in which the advertiser claimed,"Why pay 
$38.50/weekat the airport? Park at BRAN DX for just 24.99/week." A small disclaimer in this 
ad indicates that the reduced price is valid only with the advertisement and only for the first 
week. Given that the outcome of the ad, rather than its intent, is the critical issue, this 
advertiser has possibly placed itselfin a precarious position by using small disclaimers that the 
consumer is unlikely to see. Recent research shows that consumers who are not highly 
interested in an ad and are unmotivated to pay close attention to the ad are likely to be deceived 
by such disclaimers (Johar, 1995). 
All claims that are made need to be substantiated by some amount of factual evidence 
or scienti fie research. We found that many small businesses make the claim that they offer 
"the best prices anywhere." Data regarding competitors' prices, models and services on which 
these prices are available, and time periods or conditions that apply to obtain the price should 
be in the small business's files before running the ad. 
For instance, a local printer-cartridge/ribbonrecyclermakes the claim that "You will 
save up to 70% of your ribbon budget" by using the recycled ribbon as opposed to a new one. 
This business further states that "The only real difference between new and reloaded ribbons 
is the price." To make these claims, however, this business should possess not only the listings 
of the competitors' prices on comparable products, but also, quality evidence such as defect 
rate, breakage, and product life expectancy for new versus recycled ribbons. 
Additionally,advertisingclaims must not go beyond the research. One of the longest 
series of suits and countersuits arising from comparison advertising concerns is American 
Home Products, the manufacturer of Advil and Johnson & Johnson, the manufacturer of 
Tylenol (see Bixby & Lincoln, 1989). Johnson & Johnson made the claim, "There is no more 
potent pain reliever than Extra-Strength Tylenol." While this claim is true for mild and 
moderate pain, ibuprofen is more effective for severe pain. Thus, Johnson & Johnson had 
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made a claim that went well beyond the medical evidence and that claim fostered false beliefs 
in the eyes of the consumer. Along these same lines, the local printer ribbon and cartridge 
ribbon recyclerdescribed above may get into trouble by stating that "our substantial investment 
in technology pays off for you in every cartridge. We use state-of-the-art equipment and 
methods ... Again many others just can't make that claim; and it shows in their products. We 
know ... we've been there!" The claim that the pay-off occurs with every cartridge may exceed 
any quality evidence since that claim suggests a zero defect rate. 
Small businesses should also be aware that litigation can arise from general superiority 
claims even when the competitor is not actually named in the comparison advertisement. This 
type of comparative advertisement is called an indirect comparison ad (i.e., comparative ads 
in which the competitor is not explicitly named). As example, Castro! Inc., a major oil 
manufacturer and distributer, sued Pennzoil Company and Pennzoil Products Company for 
deceptive advertising when Pennzoil asserted that its motor oil" outperforms any leading motor 
oil against viscosity breakdown," and provides "longer engine life and better engine 
protection"CCastrol lnc. v. Pennzoil Co., 1993, 941 ). Interestingly, Castro! was not mentioned 
by name in the Pennzoil ad; Pennzoil merely implied superiority over all other engine oils. 
The United States District Court for New Jersey found that Pennzoil's advertisementscontained 
claims of superiority which were "literally false" since both Castro I and Pennzoil products past 
standards adopted by the Society of Automotive Engineers, The Common Market Automobile 
Constructors, General Motors, Chrysler, and Ford. Again, care must be taken to have 
substantiation of claims prior to making comparison. 
We found this type of ad to be a common strategy used by small businesses. For 
example, numerous ads were viewed in the local papers in which small business owners claim 
to be "simply the best," and to offer the "best service," or to be "distinctively better." One 
indirect comparison ad by a local chicken wings restaurant reads, "You've tried the rest, Now 
try the best!" Like the Hardee's advertisements comparing its chicken to KFC's, this small 
business has put itself at risk unless it has consumer data indicating that its chicken wings are 
preferred over the competition. 
Additionally, comparisons should be made on characteristics that are important to the 
consumer in making their decisions to buy or not buy the product. Research by Rogers and 
Williams (Rogers and Williams, 1989) concluded that comparison ads work best when the 
advertised product or service has an important functional characteristic that outperforms 
competitors' offerings. Advertisers may run into legal trouble should the ad compare irrelevant 
factors since such comparisons may inflate importance of the attribute leading to poor 
consumer choices. 
Is comparison advertising worth the risk for small businesses? We think so. A small 
business should benefit by using comparison ads which stick to the facts on important issues. 
Such ads are attention-getting, effective in changing attitudes and can create dramatic sales 
increases. The small business manager, however, must be sure that all claims can be 
substantiated prior to running the ad. It is our hope that this paper helps the small business 
decision-maker determine when comparison advertising will be beneficial to his/her firm. 
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NOTES 
I.We have used Brand X to obscure the true brand name of the park and 
shuttle. 
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§§ 647-649 (1977). 
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §558 (1977). T.here are two 
types of defamation: libel, which is defamation by written or printed word, 
and slander which is defamation by oral statement. Id. §568. 
4. Id. at 559. 
5. The distinction between defamation and injurious falsehood can be crucial 
in cases in the statue of limitations is an issue. Trade libel is governed by a 
two-year statute of limitations applicable to infringement of property rights 
whereas, defamation (libel or slander) is subject to a one-year limitations 
period. See e.g. Guess. Inc. v. Superior Court (Jeff Hamilton. Inc.), 176 Cal. 
App. 3d 473, 222 Cal. Rptr. 79 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1986). 
6. The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §1125(a). 
7. The Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 (TLRA), Pub.L.No. 100-667, 
Sec. 136, 102 Stat. 3935, 3948 (15 U.S.C.§ 1051) effective November 16, 
1989. 
8. 15 U.S.C. §l 125(a) (1988). 
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